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Scholars have recently noted the role that employers can play as “mediating institutions” for 
public policy.  Mediating institutions connect the private lives of individuals with public policy 
concerns by communicating societal norms to members and providing social contexts that 
encourage a commitment to these norms.  Despite the potential importance of employers as 
mediating institutions for public policy, little scholarly attention has been devoted to employer 
mediation behavior. Accordingly, this study examines two research questions. What factors 
influence an employer’s willingness to mediate policy problems? And how effective are 
employers as mediating institutions?  The mediation behaviors of interest relate to employer 
efforts to mitigate traffic congestion and air quality problems by enabling employee “commute 
options,” which are alternatives to single-occupancy vehicle commuting to work. Drawing on 
theories of organization behavior, the study hypothesizes that self-interest, organizational 
control, and association membership will affect willingness to provide commute options.  The 
study also hypothesizes that employers providing commute options will have lower percentages 
of employees that drive to work alone. Both sets of hypotheses are supported by statistical 
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Introduction 
 Scholars have recently noted the role that employers can play as “mediating institutions” 
for public policy (Henry and Gordon, 2003; Madden, 1980).  Mediating institutions connect the 
private lives of individuals with public policy concerns by communicating societal norms to 
members and providing social contexts that encourage a commitment to these norms (Berger and 
Neuhaus, 1977).  Family, neighborhoods, religious institutions, and voluntary associations are 
viewed as the traditional mediating institutions.  However, significant increases in the percentage 
of time that people spend at work, combined with declines in the time devoted to traditional 
mediating institutions, have led employers to play an increasingly important role as mediating 
institutions (Fort, 1996). 
 In addition to serving as the focal point for peoples’ lives, employers are logical 
mediating institutions for public policy because they provide centralized access to individuals 
that may be targeted by policymakers for behavioral change (Weiss and Tschirhart, 1994). 
Employers, particularly large ones, can invest resources in helping to solve or mitigate the effects 
of social problems that affect their self-interest (Madden, 1980, p. 113).  Finally, employers 
provide the social contexts in which behavior can be sanctioned or discouraged, another 
important function of mediating institutions for public policy concerns (Berger and Neuhaus, 
1977). These features are particularly pertinent given the diminishing role of direct government 
intervention for addressing policy problems (Frederickson and Smith, 2003, p. 207). 
Despite the potential importance of employers to achieving public policy goals, little 
attention has been devoted to studying employers as voluntary mediating institutions. 1  
Accordingly, this study examines two research questions.  First, what organizational 
characteristics influence an employer’s willingness to serve as a mediating institution?  This 
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information is particularly valuable for policy managers responsible for recruiting such 
participation.  The second research question addresses the relationship between employer 
mediation and desired policy outcomes. In particular, how effective are employers as mediating 
institutions?  While policy scholars are beginning to recognize employers as mediating 
institutions, little research effort has been devoted to quantifying their results.  This study takes a 
step in that direction. 
The employer mediation behavior of interest in this study pertains to traffic congestion 
and air quality. These twin problems plague metropolitan areas with large populations, sizable 
vehicle fleets, and extensive suburbanization which, in turn, have led to significant increases in 
per-capita vehicle travel.  Employers can serve as policy mediators for these issues by promoting 
“commute options” programs to their employees.  Commute options programs include the 
provision of work modes that allow employees to avoid commuting during rush-hour traffic and 
organizational incentives designed to discourage employees from driving to work alone.  Using 
data from a cross-sectional mail survey of metropolitan Atlanta organizations, this study 
examines the organizational characteristics associated with the availability to employees of 
commute-options work modes, as well as the effects of certain policy mediation activities on the 
percentage of employees that drive to work alone. 
 The paper begins with a discussion of the literature on mediating institutions.  The second 
section describes traffic congestion and air quality as intertwined policy problems ripe for 
employer policy mediation.  Section three presents hypotheses on three organizational attributes 
thought to influence the availability of commute options to employees. The fourth section 
describes data collection, while the fifth profiles the measures and models used to test the study 
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hypotheses.  Section six profiles the model results.  Discussion and conclusion sections finalize 
the paper.  
Mediating Institutions for Public Policy 
 Berger and Neuhaus were the first scholars to examine the role of mediating institutions 
in public policy (1977).  Focusing on families, neighborhoods, churches, and voluntary 
associations, the authors contend that public policies should strengthen and utilize these 
mediating structures as a way to empower citizens to play a greater role in public policy and, 
subsequently, make them feel less alienated from government.  For example, the federal 
government could return tax dollars to neighborhoods, who as a community would decide how 
they would be spent; families could be allowed to choose their children’s schools through tuition 
vouchers; churches could receive government funding to administer social services (this before 
the advent of Bush’s faith-based funding); and voluntary associations could serve as public 
policy implementers, as occurred in 1975 when 100,000 Vietnamese refugees were resettled by 
nonprofit organizations.  Berger and Neuhaus view corporations as a one of the “megastructures” 
that included government and organized labor from which most individuals felt alienated. By 
contrast, the smaller size of families, neighborhoods, churches and voluntary corporations create 
more intimate spaces for their members to experience the consequences of their actions and thus 
develop moral character and a sense of citizenship.2  
 Madden argues that Berger and Neuhaus were wrong to exclude corporations as 
mediating institutions for public policy concerns (1980).  As do other mediating institutions, he 
asserts, corporations provide meaning and identity to employees. From a public policy 
perspective, the corporation ‘s societal location, between individual stakeholders and the 
government, provides the opportunity to work for the betterment of these stakeholder (e.g., 
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employees, shareholders and customers). This form of mediation can involve, for example, 
lobbying for laws that protect employees or suppliers or lending bulldozers to local authorities 
for clean up after a tornado. In contrast with Berger and Neuhaus, corporations are less an 
incubator for individual moral development and more a facilitator of societal good through the 
improvement of stakeholder lives. Thus organization size is a plus, potentially providing a larger 
well of financial resources from which to draw for investing in mediation activities.  
 Fort agrees that businesses are mediating structures (1996, 1997, 2001), but for reasons 
different than those of Madden’s.  According to Fort, the time people spend at work has 
displaced the time they spend participating in other mediating structures (family, neighborhood 
groups, churches, voluntary associations, etc.).  Fort is concerned with ethical corporate 
behavior, which he argues can be achieved (among other approaches) through employee 
representation in decision-making, expansion of employee ownership, and organization-wide 
moral discourse (2001, p. 115).  Fort’s conceptualization of the size of a mediating institution is 
more aligned with that of Berger and Neuhaus: the smaller the better, so that individuals have the 
opportunity to experience first-hand the consequences of their actions and learn the role of the 
good organization citizen (Fort 1996). While not written in the language of public policy, Fort 
suggests the necessity of policy mechanisms (such as tax incentives and social audits) to 
motivate businesses to formally take on the role of mediation institutions (2001, p. 115). 
 While not focusing on employers or businesses, Weiss and Tschirhart examine the role of 
mediating institutions in facilitating government-sponsored public information campaigns 
(1994).  In reviewing the promotional materials for 100 such campaigns, these scholars observe 
that many campaigns target mediating institutions, including families and communities, to 
provide a social context for members that will reinforce the behavioral goals of public 
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information campaigns.  In doing so, mediating institutions can serve as an additional channel 
through which messages about desired behavioral changes can be disseminated.  
 Henry and Gordon, testing Weiss and Tschirhart’s assertions, are the first scholars to 
identify employers as mediating institutions for public policy implementation.  These scholars 
evaluate a public information campaign in Atlanta, GA, to determine whether altering workplace 
norms affect driving behavior on ozone-alert days (2003).  The campaign in question works 
through public and private employers to disseminate messages regarding the importance of 
telecommuting, alternative work schedules, and alternative commute options on days anticipated 
to be smoggy.  State agencies are required by executive order to reduce single-occupancy vehicle 
commutes by 20 percent on high ozone days and to develop plans for achieving that goal.  While 
federal employers in the area face no such mandate, they nonetheless have agreed to develop and 
execute strategies for reducing commuting. Local government agencies have been encouraged by 
the public information campaign to do the same.  Using daily telephone survey data from 4860 
Atlanta residents over a 153-day period, Henry and Gordon analyzed awareness of ozone issues 
and daily driving patterns. Given that state institutions are mandated to reduce commuting on 
ozone alert days, and that federal and local agencies have followed suit, Henry and Gordon use 
an individual’s employment by a government agency as a proxy for membership in a mediating 
institution. The results indicate that employees of these mediating institutions are responsible for 
almost all of the reductions in commuting miles on ozone alert days, leading the authors to 
conclude that without institutional cooperation, alternatives to solo commutes during rush hour 
are not an option for many employees. 
 The research presented in this paper shares common elements with various aspects of the 
literature on mediating institutions.  As do Berger and Neuhaus, we contend that mediating 
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institutions can ease citizens’ feelings of alienation from the state.  In the case of commute 
options programs, avoiding rush-hour traffic and solo commuting to work may make employees 
feel they are doing their part in alleviating traffic congestion and air quality.  Like Madden, we 
concur that corporations play a critical social role, particularly in an age of dwindling resources 
for direct government intervention in complex policy problems.  We agree with Fort that 
employers are a primary mediating institution for most citizens.  Like Henry and Gordon, we 
focus on employers as mediating institutions. Unlike Henry and Gordon, our mediating 
institutions include mostly voluntary private employers.  As in Weiss and Tschirhart’s study, our 
policy mediators are disseminating messages that encourage conformance with government 
goals, in this case, reduced traffic congestion and improved air quality. 
 
Employers as Mediating Institutions for Traffic Congestion and Air Quality 
 Traffic congestion and poor air quality are intertwined policy problems that plague 
metropolitan areas across the nation.  Sprawling urban development patterns and a dramatic 
increase in the number of vehicles in the United States have produced traffic congestion that has 
clogged the nation’s highways and interstates.  Citizens and policymakers alike consistently rank 
traffic congestion as an important quality-of-life issue (TRB, 2001; Burchell, et al, 2002).  
Traffic congestion also incurs significant economic costs, by some estimates $63 billion per year 
in fuel and time losses to the traveling public in urban areas (Schrank and Lomax, 2002). 
In addition to lowering quality of life and incurring significant economic costs, traffic 
congestion is a public health issue.  Vehicles produce 40 to 60 percent of the emissions that 
contribute to ground-level ozone in urban areas, which aggravates breathing for children, the 
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elderly, and people with respiratory conditions (USEPA, 2003). Furthermore, congested traffic 
generally produces more emissions than free-flowing traffic  (TRB, 1995).  
 To understand the importance of employers as mediating institutions for traffic 
congestion and air quality, one must first understand how work travel contributes to these 
problems.  Over three-quarters of all trips made to and from work in the United States in 2000 
were in single-passenger vehicles (Reschovsky, 2004).  In the context of this study, vehicle 
commuting to work and back represents approximately 22 percent of all daily trips taken in the 
Atlanta region (ARC, 2003).  While 22% may not seem a significant figure, this fraction of 
activity occurs predominantly under congested conditions, which significantly elevates fuel 
consumption and emissions for all vehicles operating during the commute period. Furthermore, 
civil engineers design and construct highway systems to facilitate travel during the most 
congested condition.  Hence, tremendous capital infrastructure costs are associated with 
providing freeway lanes that are needed for only a few hours each day. Thus reductions in 
single-occupancy work commutes have a significant potential to reduce peak-period congestion 
which, in turn, reduces total daily regional emissions by a few percent. This seemingly minor 
emissions reduction for most urban areas is significant given the requirement to achieve 
attainment of the national ambient air quality standards. 
While employers do not necessarily control how employees get to work, employers do 
control work modes and work schedules that influence these patterns.  For example, compressed 
work weeks allow employees to work forty-hours in four days or eighty hours in nine days, 
thereby eliminating the need for a day of commuting to the worksite.  Teleworking (also known 
as telecommuting) allows employees to work at home or at another location part-time or full-
time, thereby eliminating commuting during these times.  Flexible scheduling enables employees 
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to avoid rush hour traffic by establishing their own start and finish times for work.  Employers 
can also provide incentives to employees that reduce solo commuting, such as preferential 
parking for vanpools and deduction of transit and vanpool expenses from pre-tax income. 
Because U.S. employers are not required to offer commute options to employees, public 
agencies and nonprofit associations concerned with traffic congestion and air quality promote 
commute options to employers.  For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the 
U.S. Department of Transportation co-sponsor “Best Workplaces for Commuters”, a program 
which publicizes employers that offer commute options.  In addition to providing public 
recognition, Best Workplaces for Commuters offers training on implementing commute options 
programs and access to web-based tools for program tracking. 
At the local level, transportation management associations (TMAs) provide commute 
options services to employers.  These geographically-based alliances of employers and property 
managers offer technical assistance and centralized coordination of programs that employers can 
participate in, such as ridesharing and guaranteed ride home programs.  There are 130 TMAs 
across the United States, eight of which are located in the Atlanta metropolitan area. 
The Clean Air Campaign is another source of commute options assistance for Atlanta 
employers.  A partnership of government, business, civic, health, environmental and educational 
organizations, the Clean Air Campaign is a non-profit organization that serves as an information 
clearinghouse for metropolitan Atlanta organizations (including TMAs) that have programs in 
place to address traffic congestion and air pollution.  The Clean Air Campaign provides services 
similar to those provided by Atlanta’s eight TMAs, although there are three key differences. 
First, the Clean Air Campaign publicizes the participation of its members through an online 
membership listing and case studies that profile programmatic successes, whereas TMAs do not.  
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Second, the Clean Air Campaign focuses on initiatives across Atlanta, whereas TMAs operate 
within specific geographic areas.  For example, the Clean Air Campaign launched the Telework 
Leadership Initiative in 2003, selecting 17 employers across the metropolitan Atlanta area to 
receive consulting services and staff reimbursement funds to develop teleworking programs over 
a six-month period.  Finally, the Clean Air Campaign’s annual budget is quite large 
(approximately $7 million) and much of the funding is dedicated to mainstream media 
advertising campaigns designed to increase public awareness of transportation and air quality 
issues.3 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 This section focuses on the theoretical bases for hypotheses regarding an employer’s 
willingness to serve as a mediating institution for traffic congestion and air quality concerns.  
Four organizational attributes are expected to influence an employer’s willingness to offer 
commute options to employees: (1) the perception that doing so advances organizational self-
interest, (2) internal control exerted over employees, and (3) membership in associations that 
promote policy mediation.  These factors were chosen for their applicability to commute options 
programs, as well as their potential influence on employer willingness to mediate other types of 
public policy problems. 
 
Self-Interest and Policy Mediation 
 Why do employers voluntarily mediate policy problems?  Organizational self-interest is a 
logical starting point (Madden, 1980, p. 116).  From this perspective, firms may behave 
voluntarily in ways that benefit society only when there is a perceived economic payoff (direct or 
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indirect) for doing so.  The literature on corporate environmental behavior is replete with 
examples that demonstrate the importance of perceived self-interest in motivating pro-social 
behavior: Industrial facilities may voluntarily exceed regulatory requirements in an effort to 
influence future regulations (Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000; 
Segerson and Micelli, 1998), seek public recognition (Arora and Cason, 1996), or attempt to 
differentiate themselves in the marketplace (Prakash, 2000).  Government agencies appear to be 
convinced of the importance of corporate self-interest when they stress the direct and indirect 
economic benefits of voluntarily participating in public policy programs (Welch, Bretschneider 
and Mazur, 2000). 
Government and nonprofit organizations devoted to traffic congestion and air quality 
issues assert that commute options programs can strengthen personnel recruitment and retention, 
improve employee productivity, and enhance public image.  Commute options are expected to 
enhance productivity because employees spend less time in traffic and more time at work.  Less 
time commuting means more time to balance work and family, strengthening a firm’s ability to 
recruit new employees and retain existing ones.  Flexible work schedules designed to minimize 
commute times may also play a role in employee recruitment and retention.  Commute options 
programs are also expected to enhance an organization’s reputation by signaling that they are 
good employers and good corporate citizens. 
Based on the benefits touted by government promoters of commute options programs, 
employers perceiving these positive impacts from commute options work modes are expected to 
make them more widely available to employees.  While the hypothesis seems self-evident, 
testing it will suggest the persuasiveness of current marketing messages: If no such relationship 




 The extent to which an organization controls its employees may also influence its 
willingness to mediate policy problems.  Organization control is defined as actions taken to 
reduce employee discretion (Wintrobe, 1982) and align employee behaviors with organizational 
goals (Hall, 1963).  Policy mediation, by definition, requires employers to sacrifice some control 
by allowing workplace norms to be aligned with broader societal norms.  For example, 
companies that participate in the Voluntary Protection Program of the U.S. Occupational and 
Health Safety Administration (OSHA) seek to empower employees to make companies 
accountable for worker safety.  Participants in the program are thus required to provide their 
employees with access to self-inspections and safety data; enable employees to report hazards; 
and to file a complaint with OSHA if the employer does not comply with the terms of the 
voluntary agreement.  In the OSHA example, companies empower employees to hold them 
accountable for broader societal obligations, an endeavor which requires relinquishment of some 
control. 
 Potter notes that commute options programs reduce managerial control over employees 
by altering work patterns (2003).  For example, telecommuting employees work at home, out of 
direct supervisory site, facilitating shirking and opportunistic behaviors.  Flexible work 
schedules, which allow employees to work staggered rather than fixed schedules, impose greater 
uncertainty and complexity in scheduling.  For example, it may become more difficult to 
schedule meetings or coordinate tasks when employees work different schedules.  Compressed 
work weeks reduce the number of days that employees work onsite, thereby increasing the risk 
that employees will be needed on an “off” day.  Given the potential for commute options work 
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modes to complicate managerial control, more controlling organizations are expected to make 
these work modes less available to employees. 
 
Association Membership 
Voluntary associations may also play an important role in persuading employers to serve as 
policy mediators.  Voluntary associations have been defined in various ways, including “a body 
of people who have organized themselves in pursuit of particular goals” (Berger and Neuhaus, 
1977, p. 34).  Associations provide a socialization process by which identity is developed and 
norms are communicated (Fort, 1996).  Members, in turn, conform their behavior to the norms of 
the association because they desire the approval and respect of fellow members and because 
doing so will enhance their reputation (King, 2002). 
The corporate environmental behavior literature provides much of the evidence that 
association membership affects behavioral change in organizations.  Firms that are members of 
environmental groups tend to have lower toxic releases than firms not belonging to such groups 
(Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett, 2000).  Trade groups have been shown to influence marinas to 
undertake best environmental practices (May, 2003).  And bleached Kraft pulp producers that 
were members of environmental groups were more likely to use cleaner technologies than non-
members (Maynard and Shortle, 2001).  In these examples, the associations serve as mediating 
institutions by influencing their members to behave in socially desirable ways. This leads to the 
expectation that employers that are members of voluntary associations addressing air quality and 





The hypotheses are tested with data collected from a cross-sectional mail survey of Atlanta 
employers conducting between April 2003 and January 2004.  The sample comprised a random 
selection of organizations employing less than 5000 employees from the Metropolitan Atlanta 
Chamber of Commerce (MACOC) membership list (n=262); a census of MACOC members 
employing over 5000 employees (n=38); a random selection of 300 employers of 4000 
household participants in the SMARTRAQ regional travel diary study4; and all 207 employers of 
household participants in the Commute Atlanta study, a research effort designed to examine the 
influence of variable pricing on driving behavior.5  
Employers were telephoned to identify their human resource directors and to verify 
contact names, titles, and mailing address information.  Human resource (HR) directors were 
selected as the survey contact because they tend to be involved in the implementation of 
commute options programs.  Once contact data were finalized, the survey process proceeded in 
four stages. First, an alert letter was mailed to the sample notifying them that the survey was 
forthcoming and explaining the survey’s purpose and importance of participation.  A few days 
later the sample was mailed a printed survey with cover letter, a postage-paid return envelope, 
and a one-dollar incentive.  The cover letter conveyed that recipients could decline participation 
by returning the blank survey.  The survey also allowed HR directors to respond by web, giving 
them a website address and unique identification number to enter the site.  A reminder follow-up 
postcard was mailed a few days after the first survey package.  Non-respondents were contacted 
two weeks later with a cover letter emphasizing the importance of participation, a replacement 
survey, and a postage-paid return envelope.   
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An additional contact was made with Chamber members, which consisted of a 
replacement survey with a postage-paid return envelope, another one dollar incentive, and a 
cover letter from the president of the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce (MACOC) 
requesting participation.  Rather than targeting human resource directors, the follow-up MACOC 
letter was addressed to upper-level managers in charge of operations. This additional contact 
boosted response rates from the Chamber sample by approximately seven percent. Additional 
details on recruitment and survey methods can be found in Feng, et al. (2005). 
Prior to administering the full survey to these employers, a pre-test survey was conducted 
among 30 companies randomly selected from a web-based directory.  The pre-test process 
resulted in minor changes to the survey, including the clarification of ambiguous wording and 
the elimination of individual items that had yielded non-variant responses.   
The survey process yielded a 51 percent response rate (n=412), with 40 percent of 
respondents from the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber sample (n=166); 25 percent of respondents 
from the Commute Atlanta employer sample (n=105); and 34 percent of respondents from the 
SMARTRAQ employer sample (n=141). (The response rates within these sampling frames were 
55, 51, and 47 percent, respectively.) To estimate nonresponse bias, the size of firms returning 
surveys were compared to those not returning them.  This exercise was conducted for the 
Chamber sample only, because this sampling frame was the only one for which size information 
was available.  A Chi-Square test indicates that firm size is independent of response rate (Chi-
Square Statistic=1.27, Asympotic Sig=0.97).  
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Models and Measures 
The statistical models employed here seek to accomplish two goals.  The first goal is to estimate 
the influence of organizational characteristics on the availability to employees of three different 
commute options work modes.  The second goal is to evaluate how various employer policy 
mediation activities related to traffic congestion and air quality influence employee commute 
behavior.  The models of work mode availability employ an ordered probit approach because the 
three dependent variables (levels of availability to employees of compressed workweeks, flexible 
scheduling, and teleworking) are ordinal, but the exact distances between levels of availability 
are unknown (Long, 1997, p. 114). The second model uses two-sided Tobit because the 
dependent variable, percentage of employees driving to work alone, is truncated at 0 and 100. 
Tables 1 and 2 list descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables in both 
models.  
 
Determinants of Employer Policy Mediation 
The dependent variables in the first set of models are the levels of availability to employees of 
work modes that avoid rush-hour commutes.  There are three work modes relevant to commute 
options: flexible work schedules, compressed workweeks, and one or two days of teleworking 
per week.  Work modes are coded “0” for “not available to employees”, “1” for “available to 
some employees”, and “2” for “available to all employees”. 
The independent variables to be used include organization control; the perceived benefits 
of particular commute options work modes; membership in the Clean Air Campaign, an Atlanta-
wide nonprofit association that promotes employer mediation activities for traffic congestion and 
air quality; membership in transportation management associations, which also promote 
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employer mediation activities for traffic congestion and air quality, but pertain to specific 
geographic areas; and membership in both the Clean Air Campaign and a transportation 
management association. The total number of people employed at the worksite (size) is included 
as a control variable, as is a dummy variable indicating whether the survey respondent is a state 
agency, institution of higher learning or federal agency.  The identity of these organizations is 
important because state agencies and public institutions are required, by a 1997 gubernatorial 
executive order, to formulate commute options plans for ozone alert days.  Although not a 
requirement, federal agencies in the Atlanta area followed suit as a result (Henry and Gordon, 
2003, p. 51). 
Three measures of organization control are employed: procedural control, job autonomy, 
and hierarchy.  Procedural control is operationalized by a scale that sums a respondent’s level of 
agreement (from 0=strongly disagree to 3=strongly agree) with the following three statements 
about their organization’s control preferences: (1) Going through proper channels is constantly 
stressed; (2) Whatever situation arises, we always have proper procedures for dealing with it; 
and (3) In this organization, compliance with rules and procedures is very important.  Thus the 
procedural control scale ranges in value from 0, indicating strong disagreement with all three 
statements, to 9, indicating strong agreement with all three statements. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
scale is 0.70.  Job autonomy is taken as survey participant’s level of agreement (from 0=strongly 
disagree to 3=strongly agree) with the following statement: The way work is done is left pretty 
much to the employee doing the work. (The organization control and employee autonomy 
measures are based on Aiken and Hage 1966). Hierarchy is measured using survey participant’s 
numerical assessment of the level of hierarchical authority in their organization, from 0 
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signifying few layers of authority to 10 signifying many layers of authority (Bozeman and 
Rainey, 1998).   
 Three dummy variables are implemented for membership in associations that promote 
commute options: one dummy variable for members of only the Clean Air Campaign (nine 
percent of the sample); one dummy variable for members of only a transportation management 
association (three percent of the sample); and one dummy variable for members of both (six 
percent of the sample). In each case, variables are coded “1” to indicate membership or “0” to 
indicate non-membership.  
Benefits are measured by a scale that sums the survey respondent’s indication of the 
nature of the impacts (0=Negative, 1=Neutral, 2=Positive) that commute options have on 
recruitment, retention, productivity, and reputation.  The commute options programs of interest 
include compressed workweeks, flexible arrival and departure times and one to two days per 
week of teleworking.  Thus, benefit scores range from “0” for employers perceiving negative 
impacts from all modes to “8” for employers perceiving positive impacts of all modes.   
 
Modeling Employee Commute Behavior 
The second model examines the impact of employer mediation activities on the percentage of 
employees that drive alone to work. Four types of activities are examined, all of which may 
influence employee behavior, not only by facilitating solo commute alternatives, but also by 
signaling employer values.  The first mediation activity is the provision of personnel benefits that 
facilitate alternative commute patterns.  This activity is operationalized as the sum of such 
benefits offered by an employer.  There are nine activities of interest, including the pre-tax 
deduction of public transit expenses and participation in a guaranteed ride home program.6  
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Twenty percent of survey respondents offer at least one of these benefits, and 15 percent offer 
two or more benefits.  By contrast, fifty-four percent of the respondents offer none of these 
benefits.  Employers that offer more commute-related benefits are expected to have lower 
percentages of employees driving to work alone.  
 The second employer mediation activity is the extent to which employers promote 
commute options programs.  Three programs are of interest: guaranteed ride home, which 
guarantees ridesharing employees a trip home under emergency circumstances; 1-800-
RIDEFIND, which located fellow carpoolers for commuters; and the promotion of public transit 
routes and fares.  Promotion frequency includes “Never” or “Rarely” (0); “Once or Twice Per 
Year (1); or “Each Month or More” (2).  The measure sums the promotion frequency for all three 
programs.  Thus, potential scores range from 0, for all three programs rarely promoted, to 6, for 
all three programs promoted monthly or more.  Eighty percent of the sample rarely promotes any 
of the three programs, while twenty percent of employers in the sample promote at least one 
program once or twice a year.  Employers that promote these commute options more frequently 
are expected to experience a lower percentage of employees driving to work alone. 
The third mediation activity is the provision of parking incentives for employees using 
commute options, including preferential or reserved parking for carpools and vanpools, shuttle 
service to and from offsite parking areas, cash or transit passes to employees who give up 
parking spaces, and preferential or reserved parking for alternative fuel vehicles.  Parking 
incentives are treated as unique given the critical impact that parking availability has on 
commute behavior (Vaca and Kuzmyak, 2005).  The parking incentives variable ranges from 
zero, indicating none of the four incentives are offered, to four, indicating that all of the 
incentives are offered.  Fifteen percent of the sample offers at least one these incentives, while 
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eighty-five percent of the sample offers none.  Employers offering more of these incentives are 
expected to have lower solo commuting rates. 
The fourth policy mediation activity is employee-paid parking, which is also expected to 
significantly lower the percentage of employees that drive to work alone.  The provision of free 
parking is a significant economic benefit factored into the commute decision.  Approximately 85 
percent of respondent organizations offer free parking to their employees.  Employee-paid 
parking is measured as a dummy variable, with 0 indicating those organizations that pay for 
employee parking and 1 for those organizations that require employees to pay for their own 
parking. 
Parking availability is also included in the model as a control variable, based on the 
assumption that more time required to find parking is a deterrent to solo commuting. This 
variable is coded “0” if parking can be immediately found upon arrival to work; “1” if it takes a 




Commute Options Work Mode Availability Models7,8 
 Table 3 outlines results of the compressed workweeks model.  As expected, organizations that 
perceive higher benefits from compressed workweeks indicate more availability of compressed 
workweeks to employees (p<0.01). Also as expected, organizations who are members of the 
Clean Air Campaign and both the Clean Air Campaign and a transportation management 
association make compressed workweeks more available than nonmembers of such associations 
(p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively).  However, membership in a transportation management 
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association alone is not a significant model influence. Hierarchy is associated with less 
compressed work week availability (p<0.10), as expected, although procedural control is not a 
significant model influence.  Higher employee autonomy is correlated with less availability of 
compressed work weeks, contradicting expectations (p<0.10).  Larger organizations make 
compressed work weeks more available to employees than do smaller organizations (p<0.05). 
Status as a state institution or federal agency is not a significant model variable. Fully 
standardized coefficients indicate that perceived benefits, Clean Air Campaign membership, and 
organization size are the strongest model influences.9  McKelvey and Zevoina’s R2, which for 
ordinal outcomes most closely approximates the ordinary least squares R2 statistic (Long and 
Freese, 2003, p. 163), is 0.23 for this model  
 Ordered probit results for the flexible scheduling model are outlined in Table 4. The 
perception of flexible scheduling benefits is associated with a greater availability of flexible 
scheduling to employees (p<0.01).  Procedural control is a significant influence in this model, 
associated with less availability of flexible scheduling to employees (p<0.05). Hierarchy, 
however, is an insignificant model influence. Employee autonomy is associated with greater 
availability of flexible scheduling to employees (p<0.05), in contrast with its negative correlation 
to compressed work week availability.  Clean Air Campaign membership is associated with 
greater availability of flexible scheduling to employees (p<0.10), but neither membership in a 
transportation management association nor memberships in both the Clean Air Campaign and a 
transportation management association are significant model influences. Organization size and 
classification as a state institution or federal agency are associated with a higher availability of 
flexible scheduling to employees (both p<0.05).  Fully standardized coefficients indicate that 
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perceived benefits of flexible scheduling is by far the strongest model influence, with employee 
autonomy serving as a distant second.  McKelvey and Zevoina’s R2 is 0.30 for this model.  
 Table 5 lists results for the telecommuting model, whose dependent variable is the level 
of availability to employees one to two days per week of working from home.  Positive 
perceived benefits from telecommuting are associated with greater availability of telecommuting 
to employees (p<0.01).  Employee autonomy is associated with greater availability of 
telecommuting p<0.01), whereas higher procedural control is associated with lesser availability 
(p<0.10).  Once again, hierarchy is not a significant model influence.  Clean Air Association 
membership is associated with a higher availability of telecommuting (p<0.01), although 
membership in a transportation management association only or membership in both the Clean 
Air Campaign and a transportation management association are insignificant model influences.  
Organization size is a significant positive influence on telecommuting availability (p<0.05),10 but 
status as a state institution or federal agency is not.  Fully standardized coefficients reveal that 
perceived benefit is the strongest influence on work mode availability, with employee autonomy 
a distant second in strength.  McKelvey and Zevoina’s R2 for this model is 0.30. 
 One way to substantively interpret ordered probit results is to examine the probability 
changes in the values of the dependent variable given changes in the values of the explanatory 
variables, holding other model influences constant (Long, 1997, p. 135).  Table 6 lists these 
probability changes in the three levels of availability of each work mode given a move from 
minimum to maximum values of the statistically significant independent variables, holding all 
other variables constant. 
 Going from the smallest to largest employer produces the largest increases in the 
probability of offering commute options work modes, although more so for compressed 
 24
workweeks and teleworking (69 percent and 61 percent) than for flexible scheduling (20 
percent). A move from the lowest to the highest value of perceived benefits is also associated 
with sizeable increases in probabilities that organizations will offer commute work modes to 
some or all employees.  This effect appears highest for flexible scheduling (59 percent) and 
lowest for compressed workweeks (37 percent).   
 Clean Air Campaign membership has the most impact on the probabilities of offering 
compressed workweeks and teleworking to some or all employees (29 and 27 percent increases 
over nonmembers), with lesser impacts on the probability of offering flexible scheduling (8 
percent).  Membership in both the Clean Air Campaign and a transportation management 
association is associated with a 19 percent increase in the availability to some or all employees of 
compressed workweeks. An organization’s status as a state institution or federal agency 
increases the probability of offering flexible scheduling by 17 percent. 
 A move from lowest to highest employee autonomy increasing the probabilities of 
offering teleworking and flexible scheduling to some or all employees by 34 percent and 25 
percent, respectively, while it lowers the probability of offering compressed work weeks by 22 
percent.  A move from lowest to highest procedural control reduces the probability that an 
organization will offer teleworking by 30 percent, as well as the probability that an organization 
will offer flexible scheduling by 21 percent.  An increase from the least to the most hierarchical 
organizations reduces the probability of offering compressed workweeks by 15 percent. 
 
Employee Commute Behavior Model 
Coefficients11 from the Tobit regression model of solo-commute behavior are reported in Table 
7.12  For every additional commute options benefit offered, the reported percentage of employees 
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driving to work alone decreases by 2.5 percent (p<0.01).  Every additional increase in the level 
of promotion frequency reduces solo commute percentages by nearly two percent (p<0.05). 
Additional time required to find a parking space decreases drive-alone percentages by nearly 
four percent (p<0.05).  However, the number of commute-alternative parking incentives and 
employee-paid parking do not significantly influence the percentage of employees driving to 
work alone (p>0.10).  The chi-square statistic for the model (calculated by doubling the 
difference in the estimated log-likelihoods for the fitted model and a null model with only an 
intercept) is significant at five degrees of freedom (80.67, p<0.00), indicating an acceptable fit. 
 An examination of fully standardized coefficients indicates that the provision of commute 
options benefits has the strongest effect on drive-alone percentages, with a one standard 
deviation increase in benefits (1.70 of nine benefits) reducing the percentage of drive-alone 
employees by 0.56 of a standard deviation (8.40 percent).  Time to park has the second strongest 
effect, in which a one-standard deviation increase in time required to park (roughly ½ of a three-
point scale) also reduces solo commuting by 0.27 of a standard deviation (four percent).  A one 
standard deviation increase in promotion frequency (1.05) also decreases drive-alone percentage 
rates by 0.27 of a standard deviation (four percent). 
 
Discussion 
Let us begin by interpreting the results of the commute options work modes models. To facilitate 
discussion, Table 8 reports the coefficients and significant levels of the explanatory variables 
across the different types of work modes. 
 The model results support the hypothesis that organizations perceiving more benefits 
from commute options work modes will make them more available than organizations perceiving 
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less such benefit.  The perception of organizational benefit appears to be the strongest predictor 
of the availability of the various alternative work modes.  These results suggest that mediation 
behavior is indeed driven by self-interest (Fort, 1996; Madden, 1980). The more practical 
implication of the result is that government promoters have correctly identified the advantages of 
commute options, namely, employee retention, employee recruitment, and productivity.  This is 
no small matter for government and nonprofit promoters of commute options: Knowing that 
marketing messages are “on target” is one form of program effectiveness that contributes to 
successful recruitment of organizations into the program. 
 The organizational control measures yield mixed results for their influence on work mode 
availability.  Higher procedural control is associated with less availability of flexible scheduling 
and teleworking, but has no statistically significant effect on compressed work weeks.  Hierarchy 
is associated with less availability of compressed workweeks, but has no statistically significant 
effect on flexible scheduling or teleworking availability.  Employee autonomy is associated with 
greater availability of flexible scheduling and teleworking, but less availability of compressed 
workweeks.   
 Hierarchy and procedure may vary in the significance of their impacts on work mode 
availability because they invoke different types of control. Hierarchy involves layers of authority 
for approving organizational tasks which may be hindered if employees (either the ones seeking 
approval or the ones granting it) are onsite for fewer than five days.  By comparison, procedural 
control, which seeks to reduce organizational uncertainty by the imposition of rules, may have 
more negative impacts on teleworking and flexible scheduling because these work modes, by 
definition, invoke a greater level of uncertainty in how and when employees perform their duties. 
Finally, the negative relationship between employee autonomy and compressed work weeks may 
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indicate a tradeoff between autonomy and time: Allowing personnel to choose how and when 
they perform tasks may work against compressing work into fewer days. 
 The results support the hypothesis that members of the Clean Air Campaign will make 
commute options work modes more available than non-members.  However, membership in 
transportation management associations does not significantly influence work mode availability. 
And only in the case of compressed workweeks does membership in both organizations increase 
work mode availability to employees. It should be noted that the Clean Air Campaign is an 
Atlanta-wide initiative, with a much larger budget and a higher percentage of federal funding 
than most transportation management associations, which pertain to specific geographic areas 
and can vary widely in the scope of their mediation activities.  The broader implication of the 
result is that certain associations (in this case, well-funded and broadly based) may more 
effectively serve as mediating institution recruiters.   
 It is also possible that Clean Air Campaign membership increases commute option 
mediation activities, not due to association persuasion, but because good corporate citizens self-
select into its membership. From this perspective, the Clean Air Campaign membership may be 
biased towards organizations motivated to contribute to the public good in a manner similarly 
ascribed to public servants (Brewer, Selden and Facer 2000, Perry and Wise 1990, Perry 1997).  
Unfortunately, we lack the data to distinguish the effects of an organization’s public service ethic 
from the efficacy of the Clean Air Campaign exhortations to provide commute options to 
employees. 
 The final modeling exercise seeks to explain the percentage of employees that drive to 
work alone as a function of four employer mediation activities (Table 7).  Two of the four 
activities significantly influence the percentage of employees that drive to work alone.  The first 
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is the provision of commute options benefits, including access to guaranteed ride home program, 
the pre-tax deduction of carpool, vanpool and transit expenses, and onsite sale of tokens and 
transit passes.  An examination of fully-standardized coefficients indicates that the availability of 
these benefits exerts the strongest influence on solo commute percentages.  Perhaps commute 
options benefits are an important mechanism for altering commuting behavior because they 
signal an organization’s willingness to invest its own resources in addressing traffic congestion 
and air quality, in addition to providing mechanisms that facilitate an employee’s ability to take 
individual action in addressing these problems. 
 The frequency with which employers promote external commute options programs 
appears to have a significant influence on solo commuting.  While such promotion activity is not 
as resource intensive as the provision of personnel benefits, it still may have the effect of 
communicating to employees social norms of importance to the organization.   
 The model’s two remaining employer mediation activities, parking incentives and 
employee-paid parking, do not significantly influence solo commuting. The insignificance of 
employee-paid parking appears, at first, to contradict decades of studies on the influence of paid 
parking on solo driving (TRB, 2005).  However, these studies address parking pricing elasticity – 
the relationship between parking pricing and parking consumption -- rather than the relationship 
between employee-paid parking and solo commute percentages. It is possible that employee-paid 
parking is not a significant model influence because time to park has greater impacts on solo 
driving than paying or not paying for parking. This suggestion is born out by the exclusion of 
time-to-park in the Tobit model, which produces a significant negative effect for employee-paid 
parking (p<0.05). More research is needed to explore the relative contribution of various internal 
mediating activities on solo commute patterns. 
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 It is striking that even the strongest influence on solo commuting behavior makes only 
small dents in the percentages of employees that drive to work alone.  Keep in mind that Atlanta 
commutes are more like journeys: According to the 2003 American Community Survey, five 
metropolitan Atlanta counties have commutes that fall into the top 100 of all counties in the 
nation.  Residents of Gwinnett County, eighteenth on the list, average a commute time of 30.8 
minutes, tying with Cook County, IL, and Riverside County, CA (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003).  
That the vast majority of Atlanta employees insist on solo commutes under these arduous 
conditions indicates the challenges of modifying driving behavior in an automobile-dependent 
society.  
 Three caveats are in order. First, the results are limited by the use of Atlanta employers 
for the study sample. The Atlanta corporate community has a reputation for “civic cooperation,” 
working internally and with public officials to further the public interest, an approach applied in 
particular to urban planning and revitalization (Stone 1989). Thus, the mediation activities of 
Atlanta employers may not translate to metropolitan areas whose corporate communities lack a 
history of civic cooperation on public issues.13  Second, the sample does not represent Atlanta 
employers as a whole, given the use of the Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber membership list (forty 
percent of the sample), which over-represents larger organizations and possibly “good corporate 
citizens” more likely to engage in policy mediation. Third, the data are based on managerial 
estimates of employee commute patterns, which could be inaccurate or biased. Additional 




This paper has analyzed the role of employers as mediating institutions for employee commuting 
behavior, which affects traffic congestion and air quality. The results yield two broad 
conclusions. First, employers can influence employee commute behavior through policy 
mediation activities, although the magnitude of these changes is small.  Second, certain employer 
attributes are associated with a greater propensity to mediate through commute options activities, 
including voluntary association membership, organization control, and perceived self-interest. 
Knowing these characteristics is important to government and non-profit promoters of commute 
options programs, who must “know their clients” and be able to effectively invest marketing 
resources -- public dollars -- where participation is most likely.  
 These results raise a broader issue associated with the role of government in promoting 
voluntary mediation to employers.  Given dwindling government resources and waning political 
will to impose direct control over individual behavior, policymakers may increasingly attempt to 
persuade employers to mediate society’s most pressing and intractable problems, such as 
individual driving behavior.  This persuasion constitutes a “marketing” function that is 
significantly different from the coercive role to which policy managers are used to playing.  The 
question becomes the extent to which public organizations can separate their coercive functions 
from their marketing functions.  Will an agency’s desire to sell compromise its ability to 
enforce?  Will private sector organizations use policy mediation as a means of offsetting coercive 
requirements?  Will policy mediation align the will of the state with the will of private 
organizations in ways that could potentially oppress, rather than empower, citizens?  These 
queries are beyond the scope of this study, but are critical to a thorough understanding of the role 




1. Employers can be coerced or persuaded to serve as mediating institutions.  For example, 
regulations by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration requiring employers to 
post safety information for workers constitute a coercive requirement to mediate public policy.  
By contrast, this study focuses on those factors associated with voluntary decisions to mediate 
policy problems. 
 
2. We appreciate the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, who urged a more careful 
delineation of the different conceptualizations of mediating institutions by the scholars discussed 
in this section.  
 
3. In fact, the Clean Air Campaign implemented the public information campaign studied by 
Henry and Gordon (2003). SMARTRAQ stands for Strategies for Metropolitan Atlanta’s 
Regional Transportation and Air Quality, a $4 million, seven-year study of Atlanta’s 
transportation and land use patterns. Participants in the study were recruited by random digit 
dialing and stratification by household income, land-use type and household size (Wolf, et al, 
2000). 
 
4. The Commute Atlanta Study consisted of households within the metropolitan Atlanta area 
selected by random digit dialing and stratified by household income, land-use type and 
household size. 
 
5. These benefits include showers for employees biking or walking to work; onsite sale of transit 
passes/tokens; organizational membership in guaranteed ride home program (which provides 
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rides home in emergency situations for employees that have carpooled or vanpooled to work); 
employer-subsidized bus, rail, or vanpool passes; bicycle lockers; employer-coordinated carpool 
or vanpool; satellite offices from which employees can work; pre-tax deductions of carpool, 
vanpool, and transit expenses; and brokering of discount bus, rail, and vanpool passes. 
 
6. Ordered probit assumes “parallel regression,” meaning that each explanatory variable has the 
same effect on the odds of different values of the dependent variable (Long, 1997, p. 140; Long 
and Freese, 2003, p. 168). To illustrate, the coefficient from a binary regression model estimating 
the relationship between employee autonomy and the probability of indicating that compressed 
workweeks are available to some employees or no employees (y≤1) should be roughly the same 
as the coefficient that estimates the relationship between employee autonomy and the probability 
that compressed work weeks are available to all employees, some employees and no employees 
(y≤2). The parallel regression assumption is violated for three of nine independent variables in 
the flexible scheduling model (hierarchy, Clean Air Campaign membership, and government 
agency status); for one of the nine independent variables in the compressed work weeks model 
(hierarchy); and for none of the independent variables in the teleworking model.  
 
7. As Long and Freese note, this is a frequently violated assumption of ordinal probit (p. 168). 
 
8. In response to violations of the parallel regression assumption, we replicate these results using 
ordinary least squares modeling and find that the direction and significance of the coefficients 
are highly similar in each of the three models. A normal probability plot of the OLS residuals 
indicate minor departures from normality for the flexible scheduling and teleworking models, but 
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more significant normality departures for the compressed workweek model. To test for 
multicollinearity, we performed ordinary least squares regression for both models and examined 
the resulting Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores. VIFs are calculated by regressing each 
independent variable on all other independent variables and then calculating the inverse of 1 
minus the resulting R2. The VIF scores from the three models never exceed 1.50, thus falling far 
short of the score of five that would suggest collinearity concerns (Berk, 2003, p. 121). 
 
9. Fully standardized coefficients convey the change in the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable given a one-unit increase in the standard deviation of an independent variable, holding 
other independent variables constant. 
 
10. While not a variable of theoretical interest, organization size appears to consistently 
influence an employer’s ability to offer commute options work modes. This result may be due to 
larger firms having more resources available to coordinate and monitor alternative work patterns 
and, in the case of telecommuting, provide computers and phone lines for at-home employees. 
 
11. Some scholars contend that straightforward Tobit coefficients do not have much substantive 
interpretation because the results apply to a latent variable (McDonald and Moffit 1980).  Still 
others interpret Tobit coefficients in the same manner as ordinary least squares coefficients 
(Long 1997).  We employ the latter approach for the sake of providing more substantive meaning 
to the study results. 
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12. The presence of heteroskedasticity in the model residuals led to the use of White’s 
heteroskedasticity- robust standard errors.  Non-normal residuals were also detected.  A Box Cox 
transformation of the dependent variable (not reported in this table, but available upon request) 
led to greater residual normality and produced the same model results. 
 
13. We thank the anonymous reviewer who raised the possibility that Atlanta organizations may 
be predisposed to a commitment to civic affairs, given their history of involvement in 
metropolitan governance (Stone 1989). 
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Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Compressed Work Weeks Availability 0.40 0 0 2 0.60
Flexible Scheduling Availability 0.98 1 0 2 0.68
Teleworking Availability 0.44 0 0 2 0.56
Compressed Work Week Benefits 5.45 6 0 8 2.11
Flexible Scheduling Benefits 6.06 7 0 8 2.02
Teleworking Benefits 5.48 6 0 8 2.30
Procedural Control 5.69 6 0 9 1.73
Employee Autonomy 1.61 2 0 3 0.71
Hierarchy 4.16 4 0 10 2.96
Clean Air Campaign 0.09 0 0 1 0.28
Transportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.03 0 0 1 0.18
Membership in Both 0.06 0 0 1 0.23
State/Federal Government 0.05 0 0 1 0.21
Size 472 105 2 23,168 1610.51
Note: Listwise n=327
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics For Variables in Work Mode Availability Models
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Solo Commute Percentage 89.38 95 0 100 15.19
Commute Options Benefits 1.12 0 0 9 1.70
Promotion Frequency 0.44 0 0 6 1.05
Commute Alternative Parking Incentives 0.24 0 0 4 0.67
Employee-Paid Parking 0.15 0 0 1 0.36
Time to Park 0.25 0 0 2 0.53
Note: Listwise n=322
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics For Variables in Solo Commute Percentage Model
Beta Robust SE z P>|z| bStdXY
Benefits 0.15 0.04 4.03 *** 0.28
Procedural Control 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.97 0.00
Employee Autonomy -0.20 0.11 -1.91 0.06 -0.13
Hierarchy -0.04 0.03 -1.65 0.10 -0.11
Clean Air Campaign 0.75 0.23 3.23 *** 0.18
Transportation Mgmt Assoc 0.37 0.45 0.82 0.41 0.06
Membership in Both 0.64 0.26 2.47 0.01 0.13
State/Federal Government 0.48 0.32 1.52 0.13 0.09
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.13 0.05 2.50 0.01 0.18
Notes: n=327; McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.23; Robust S.E. are White's Heteroskedasticity-
Robust standard errors; "bStdXY" are fully standardized coefficients; ***=p<0.01
Table 3. Ordered Probit Results of Compressed Work Week Availability
Beta Robust SE z P>|z| bStdXY
Benefits 0.22 0.04 5.77 *** 0.38
Procedural Control -0.09 0.04 -2.37 0.02 -0.14
Employee Autonomy 0.29 0.10 2.82 0.01 0.17
Hierarchy -0.04 0.03 -1.51 0.13 -0.10
Clean Air Campaign 0.32 0.19 1.68 0.09 0.08
Tranportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.38 0.36 1.07 0.29 0.06
Membership in Both 0.23 0.28 0.82 0.41 0.04
State/Federal Government 0.86 0.37 2.34 0.02 0.15
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.06 0.03 2.01 0.04 0.09
Notes: n=327; McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.30; Robust S.E. are White's Heteroskedasticity-
Robust standard errors; "bStdXY" are fully standardized coefficients; ***=p<0.01
Table 4. Ordered Probit Results of Flexible Scheduling Availability
Beta Robust SE z P>|z| bStdXY
Benefits 0.19 0.05 3.94 *** 0.36
Procedural Control -0.09 0.05 -1.85 0.07 -0.12
Employee Autonomy 0.31 0.10 3.16 *** 0.18
Hierarchy 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.84 0.01
Clean Air Campaign 0.70 0.19 3.61 *** 0.16
Transportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.28 0.36 0.77 0.44 0.04
Membership in Both 0.18 0.28 0.63 0.53 0.03
State/Federal Government 0.45 0.28 1.61 0.11 0.08
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.10 0.04 2.55 0.01 0.13
Notes: n=327; McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.30; Robust S.E. are White's Heteroskedasticity-
Robust standard errors; "bStdXY" are fully standardized coefficients; ***=p<0.01
Table 5. Ordered Probit Results of Telecommuting Availability
Compressed Work Weeks Flexible Scheduling Teleworking
Benefits 0.37 0.59 0.48
Procedural Control -0.21 -0.30
Hierarchy -0.15
Employee Autonomy -0.22 0.25 0.34




Size (Employees) 0.69 0.20 0.61
Table 6. Probability Change of Making Work Mode Available to Some or All Employees By Going From 
Minimum to Maximum Value of Independent Variable
Note: Shaded areas indicate statistically insignificant variables
Beta Robust s.e. z P>|z| bStdXY SDofX
Commute Options Benefits -2.49 0.79 -3.18 *** -0.56 1.70
Promotion Frequency -1.92 0.98 -1.96 0.05 -0.27 1.05
Commute Alternative Parking Incentives 0.78 1.16 0.67 0.50 0.07 0.67
Employee-Paid Parking -3.74 2.92 -1.28 0.20 -0.18 0.36
Time to Park -3.85 1.87 -2.07 0.04 -0.27 0.53
Constant 94.50 0.79 119.36 ***
Table 7. Tobit Model of Solo Commute Percentages
Notes: n=322; Beta=Tobit coefficient; Robust s.e.=White's heteroskedasticity robust standard error; bStdXY=fully standard 
coefficients; SDofX=standard deviation of X; n=329; Chi2=80.67; SDofY=15; ***=p<0.01
Beta Sig Beta Sig Beta Sig
Benefits 0.15 *** 0.22 *** 0.19 ***
Procedural Control 0.00  -0.09 ** -0.09 *
Employee Autonomy -0.20 * 0.29 ** 0.31 ***
Hierarchy -0.04 * -0.04  0.01  
Clean Air Campaign 0.75 *** 0.32 * 0.70 ***
Tranportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.37 0.38 0.28
Membership in Both 0.64 ** 0.23 0.18
State/Federal Government 0.48 0.86 ** 0.45
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.13 ** 0.06 ** 0.10 **
n
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2
Note: *** = p<0.01; **=p<0.05;*=p<0.10; Shaded=p>0.10
Table 8. Ordinal Probit Results of Commute Alternative Work Modes







Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Compressed Work Weeks Availability 0.40 0 0 2 0.60
Flexible Scheduling Availability 0.98 1 0 2 0.68
Teleworking Availability 0.44 0 0 2 0.56
Compressed Work Week Benefits 5.45 6 0 8 2.11
Flexible Scheduling Benefits 6.06 7 0 8 2.02
Teleworking Benefits 5.48 6 0 8 2.30
Procedural Control 5.69 6 0 9 1.73
Employee Autonomy 1.61 2 0 3 0.71
Hierarchy 4.16 4 0 10 2.96
Clean Air Campaign 0.09 0 0 1 0.28
Transportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.03 0 0 1 0.18
Membership in Both 0.06 0 0 1 0.23
State/Federal Government 0.05 0 0 1 0.21
Size 472 105 2 23,168 1610.51
Note: Listwise n=327
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics For Variables in Work Mode Availability Models
Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
Solo Commute Percentage 89.38 95 0 100 15.19
Commute Options Benefits 1.12 0 0 9 1.70
Promotion Frequency 0.44 0 0 6 1.05
Commute Alternative Parking Incentives 0.24 0 0 4 0.67
Employee-Paid Parking 0.15 0 0 1 0.36
Time to Park 0.25 0 0 2 0.53
Note: Listwise n=322
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics For Variables in Solo Commute Percentage Model
Beta Robust SE z P>|z| bStdXY
Benefits 0.15 0.04 4.03 *** 0.28
Procedural Control 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.97 0.00
Employee Autonomy -0.20 0.11 -1.91 0.06 -0.13
Hierarchy -0.04 0.03 -1.65 0.10 -0.11
Clean Air Campaign 0.75 0.23 3.23 *** 0.18
Transportation Mgmt Assoc 0.37 0.45 0.82 0.41 0.06
Membership in Both 0.64 0.26 2.47 0.01 0.13
State/Federal Government 0.48 0.32 1.52 0.13 0.09
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.13 0.05 2.50 0.01 0.18
Notes: n=327; McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.23; Robust S.E. are White's Heteroskedasticity-
Robust standard errors; "bStdXY" are fully standardized coefficients; ***=p<0.01
Table 3. Ordered Probit Results of Compressed Work Week Availability
Beta Robust SE z P>|z| bStdXY
Benefits 0.22 0.04 5.77 *** 0.38
Procedural Control -0.09 0.04 -2.37 0.02 -0.14
Employee Autonomy 0.29 0.10 2.82 0.01 0.17
Hierarchy -0.04 0.03 -1.51 0.13 -0.10
Clean Air Campaign 0.32 0.19 1.68 0.09 0.08
Tranportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.38 0.36 1.07 0.29 0.06
Membership in Both 0.23 0.28 0.82 0.41 0.04
State/Federal Government 0.86 0.37 2.34 0.02 0.15
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.06 0.03 2.01 0.04 0.09
Notes: n=327; McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.30; Robust S.E. are White's Heteroskedasticity-
Robust standard errors; "bStdXY" are fully standardized coefficients; ***=p<0.01
Table 4. Ordered Probit Results of Flexible Scheduling Availability
Beta Robust SE z P>|z| bStdXY
Benefits 0.19 0.05 3.94 *** 0.36
Procedural Control -0.09 0.05 -1.85 0.07 -0.12
Employee Autonomy 0.31 0.10 3.16 *** 0.18
Hierarchy 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.84 0.01
Clean Air Campaign 0.70 0.19 3.61 *** 0.16
Transportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.28 0.36 0.77 0.44 0.04
Membership in Both 0.18 0.28 0.63 0.53 0.03
State/Federal Government 0.45 0.28 1.61 0.11 0.08
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.10 0.04 2.55 0.01 0.13
Notes: n=327; McKelvey and Zavoina's R2=0.30; Robust S.E. are White's Heteroskedasticity-
Robust standard errors; "bStdXY" are fully standardized coefficients; ***=p<0.01
Table 5. Ordered Probit Results of Telecommuting Availability
Compressed Work Weeks Flexible Scheduling Teleworking
Benefits 0.37 0.59 0.48
Procedural Control -0.21 -0.30
Hierarchy -0.15
Employee Autonomy -0.22 0.25 0.34




Size (Employees) 0.69 0.20 0.61
Table 6. Probability Change of Making Work Mode Available to Some or All Employees By Going From 
Minimum to Maximum Value of Independent Variable
Note: Shaded areas indicate statistically insignificant variables
Beta Robust s.e. z P>|z| bStdXY SDofX
Commute Options Benefits -2.49 0.79 -3.18 *** -0.56 1.70
Promotion Frequency -1.92 0.98 -1.96 0.05 -0.27 1.05
Commute Alternative Parking Incentives 0.78 1.16 0.67 0.50 0.07 0.67
Employee-Paid Parking -3.74 2.92 -1.28 0.20 -0.18 0.36
Time to Park -3.85 1.87 -2.07 0.04 -0.27 0.53
Constant 94.50 0.79 119.36 ***
Table 7. Tobit Model of Solo Commute Percentages
Notes: n=322; Beta=Tobit coefficient; Robust s.e.=White's heteroskedasticity robust standard error; bStdXY=fully standard 
coefficients; SDofX=standard deviation of X; n=329; Chi2=80.67; SDofY=15; ***=p<0.01
Beta Sig Beta Sig Beta Sig
Benefits 0.15 *** 0.22 *** 0.19 ***
Procedural Control 0.00  -0.09 ** -0.09 *
Employee Autonomy -0.20 * 0.29 ** 0.31 ***
Hierarchy -0.04 * -0.04  0.01  
Clean Air Campaign 0.75 *** 0.32 * 0.70 ***
Tranportation Mgmt. Assoc. 0.37 0.38 0.28
Membership in Both 0.64 ** 0.23 0.18
State/Federal Government 0.48 0.86 ** 0.45
Size (Employees in 1000s) 0.13 ** 0.06 ** 0.10 **
n
McKelvey and Zavoina's R2
Note: *** = p<0.01; **=p<0.05;*=p<0.10; Shaded=p>0.10
Table 8. Ordinal Probit Results of Commute Alternative Work Modes
Compressed Work Weeks Flextime Teleworking 1
319
0.30
319
0.23
319
0.30
